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Chapter I
Moving International Law from Theory to
Practice: the Role of Military Manuals in
Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict
by
W. Michael Reisman* and William K. Leitzau**

ilit~ry man~als and handbo~ks cont~~ning ope,:ation~ t:Ules prescribed
by mternatlonal law (heremafter manuals ) are tmportant to the
operation of the international legal system for two related reasons. First, they
are the indispensable modality for disseminating normative information to
those whose behavior is the target of the norms in question. Second, they
are an essential component in the international lawmaking process, often the
litmus test of whether a putative prescriptive exercise has produced effective
law. Without adequate dissemination, this putative international lawmaking
is an exercise in the elaboration of myth through lex simulata1 rather than the
installation of an effective operational code.
There is a developmental aspect to both of these properties in the sense
that if they are effectuated adequately, they contribute to the operation of
the sector of international law concerned with armed conflict. There is, as
well, a necessarily comparative aspect to inquiry about these properties in
that this area of law, even more than others, depends for its vigor on
reciprocity. Unless there is a comparable and manifest "scoring" on the
manuals (or their functional equivalents) of adversaries, the symmetry
necessary for reciprocity will be absent and the norms with which they are
concerned are unlikely to be effectively incorporated into international legal
practice.

M

I. Military Manuals As A Mode of Dissemination
A.

The Importance of Dissemination
In small groups and micro-communities, the same persons who make law,
act on it, apply it and enforce it. 2 But, as Durkheim observed, the large social
organizations characteristic of most sectors of modem life require labor and
role divisions and refined task specializations} As a result, it is not only
probable that entirely different persons will make law, act on it, apply it and
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enforce it, but it is also likely that there will be considerable temporal and
social distance between the specialists performing each of these functions.
The phenomenon is not unique to international law. In the United States,
the Supreme Court encounters much the same problem. James Levine writes,
The conditions necessary for Supreme Court efficacy are much more stringent when
the people and institutions to be controlled are farther removed from the Court's range
of command and less threatened by the force of its sanctions. It is much easier for the
Supreme Court to curb a few cantankerous federal judges than to reallocate the
fundamental values of the society.4

"Causal distance," as Levine styles it, can be an even greater problem in the
more complex international political system.
In large social organizations, effective lawmaking requires an additional
step: the efficient dissemination and effectiye internalization of authoritative
norms in those persons "in the field" as it were, whose behavior is the target
of the norm in question. The process of dissemination is a necessary component
of any communication that extends beyond the mediation of subjectivities
between two proximate persons. It can be most economically expressed in
terms of Harold D. Lasswell's classic paradigm of Who/What/Whom/How/
Results/Effects. Less cryptically, Lasswell's heuristic asks for pertinent
information to be organized in terms of:
Who is communicating (Communicators)
What (Content)
To whom (Target Audiences)
Through what channels (Channels)
With what results (Immediately Changed Subjectivities)
And with what longer term effects (Long Term Changed Subjectivities}.5
When information is so organized, the aggregate consequences of a
communication are clarified and the factors that accounted for success or
failure may be analyzed, appraised and made the subject of policy
recommendations.
Our focal content is the law of armed conflict and related internationally
prescribed norms. Audiences may vary depending upon the type of activity
sought to be regulated. Decisions about the use of nuclear weapons, for
example, are unlikely to be made by men and women in the ranks.
Dissemination of norms regarding nuclear weapons employment should
therefore target higher military and political echelons. Comparative
examinations of manuals must take account of variables such as these.
We are concerned with identifying channels because, as is well known,
human beings mediate subjectivities on different levels and with varying
degrees of explicitness. As we will see, contrary messages about prescribed
behavior may be modulated simultaneously through different channels. We
are concerned with results, for lawmaking is not a form of communication
that is ritualistic, with its social functions fulfllled by the action of
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communication itself. It is designed to precipitate social results. To the extent
that it fails to do this, the entire exercise has failed. We are concerned with
longer term effects because prescriptive communications also shape
perspectives about the constitutive process6 and value regulations other than
those which have been manifestly targeted.
In a socially meaningful sense, then, the making oflaw necessarily involves
much more than the clarification and establishment of some community policy
in authoritative form. If law is to be effective, it must be transmitted and,
where necessary, translated into formulations appropriate for those operating
in the field whose behavior is the ultimate target of the principles in question.
This process, which has been variously described as promulgation,
dissemination, implementation, or publication, is a necessary step if law is
to be transformed from an exercise in theory to a matter of practice.7
Unless a large number of those who are the target of particular formulations
become familiar with and internalize the norms in question, the entire burden
of enforcement is shifted to appliers and is greatly magnified. Their resources
are limited, however, and would hardly suffice for such an enormous task.
Moreover, if the norms they are asked to apply have not been internalized
by a large part of the community, their actions appear arbitrary, retroactive
and ex post facto and undermine rather than reinforce the symbol of law. 8
Though many legal systems insist that ignorantia legis haud excusat, all seem to
appreciate that the point of legislative exercises is not to punish those who
prove to be ignorant of the law. It is to get the message across beforehand
to those who are expected to adjust their behavior in accordance with the
norm. 9
Dissemination can also precipitate the reciprocal consequence. Where an
international prescription has been internalized at the rank-and-fIle level, it
may serve to limit violations among the elites themselves. Even when
prescriptive violations appear to serve short-term special interests, elites may
find that there is rank-and-fIle resistance to norm repudiations. In effect, by
disseminating rules of warfare, national command authorities raise the costs
of violating those rules both in peace and war. Essentially, they are divesting
themselves of power in return for other expected gains. Policy changes must
first be communicated to the appropriate field authorities and then
disseminated to relevant actors-in some cases the individual troops. Even
if successfully communicated, the cost of deviating from a known policy is
much greater than that of simply reversing a govemment-to-government
statement. Neither personal demands for rectitude nor notions of chivalry
are dead among military personnel. Moreover, the effectiveness of military
units depends on leadership which exemplifies integrity.
The point merits emphasis. Dissemination not only internalizes norms
within the domestic system; it internalizes them within the members of a
warrior class who take their profession seriously. This is not to say that soldiers
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can not be made to violate international law; some will predictably do so
in violation of orders. What effective dissemination does mean, however, is
that the default position is set in favor of accepted norms, and the costs of
resetting will have to be weighed.

B.

Methods of Dissemination
Law, like all types oflearned behavior, can be transmitted in many, not
necessarily exclusive ways: by single or repetitive communication, in manifest
or latent forms, by precept and example, by positive or negative
reinforcement, etc. Transmission can be relatively simple and single-step, for
example, publication in an official gazette, or complex and multi-step as in
a sequential opinion-formation process. Each phase may be inhabited and!
or dominated by different specialist groups which are expected to interpret,
digest and formulate the message in ways that make it comprehensible and
practicable to the level they are serving.
Each phase of the transmission process may, in turn, become a sub-powerarena, in which politically relevant social forces bring to bear whatever bases
of power are relevant in the setting in order to secure an interpretation and
refashioning of the authorized policy that discriminates in their own favor.1°
In politics, as its practitioners know, there is no end to politics and, as the
adage puts it, "nothing is finished until it's done."
Consider, by way of example, the sequence of linkages by which the
Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda ll filtered down from the Supreme Court,
through the law enforcement bureaucracy, to the policemen on the beat.
Institutional interpreters at different levels acted as mediators between the
Court, with its general policy objective, and the actual law enforcement
officers. The mediators, sensitive to contexts of application in ways in which
the Court could not have been, introduced nuanced changes as they
reformulated the Miranda doctrine into an operational code. There were many
steps in this translation, involving attorneys in the Department of Justice, in
many local police departments reflecting regional diversities, and finally
commanding officers and police officers in lower grades. Before the principles
became established, there were numerous feedback loops and challenges to
the courts, with reinterpretations of various sorts.12 Academies and private
interest groups made their power felt at many points. The media played an
important role, both in transmitting the normative content of Miranda and
its social importance, while firmly anchoring it in folklore. The point of
emphasis is that a sequence of steps of this sort is indispensable if formal
prescriptions are to be even minimally effective.
The dissemination of general normative information to the modern military
is substantially the same as dissemination to any other sub-specialized
organization. Hence one will not be surprised to discover, at the constitutive
level, authorized channels for dissemination,13 authorized symbols denoting
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normative information and its level of importance14 and, at lower and more
mundane levels, the handbooks, manuals and loose-leaf collections15 so
symptomatic of large, contemporary social organizations operating in the
fluid environments that are the quintessence of modernity.
But the dissemination of international legal information and, in particular,
that part of it now known as the "law of armed conflict" makes the military
organization distinctive. The dissemination of normative information is
ordinarily eufunctional, incorporating and reinforcing the organization's
authority. In contrast, the dissemination of the law of armed conflict in the
military is (i) premised on a distinct supra-organizational authority, that is
(ii) assumed to be competent to prescribe behavior which by deftnition
contributes to the operation of the larger system but, at the same time, limits
and may even undermine the particular military organization which has
incorporated it. An important element of this presc;ribed behavior is
reciprocity, which must sometimes be ascertained by the actors subject to
the norms. Thus, the disseminating scheme is of critical signiftcance in this
context, for it represents the closest parallel to an "act" which can verify
national intent. Moreover, it is the only means to achieve deterrence, since
there are few opportunities for employment of "example" in which a post
hoc violation/punishment nexus can be observed. Hence dissemination of
normative information in the military setting is marked by simultaneous
contrary organizational dynamics in which some authoritative elements are
pressing for compliance while others are resisting it.t6
These unique features of the law of armed conflict are important in
comparative appraisals of dissemination. Precisely because there are strong
organizational dynamics militating against norm implementation,
dissemination must be contextually and systematically analyzed, not simply
acknowledged via a perfunctory check for the presence or absence of a manual
containing certain verbal formulae. Unless information in the manuals is
accompanied by secondary guidance or metacommunications indicating the
gravity and preeminence of the information, and the transmission is embedded
in an enforcement system which is adequate and vigilant, manuals themselves
mean nothing. And unless comparable manuals are in operation and in
evidence in the different latent war communities, much of the normative
information in the manuals may not be acted upon.t?
One may, then, examine the effectiveness of a military manual in terms
of content, mode of delivery, the secondary norms establishing its relative
position in the effective normative hierarchy, its system of enforcement and
reciprocity. Let us consider each of these components briefly.
(i) Content: We are not interested in the existence of a manual on
the simple-minded assumption that all manuals are the same.t 8 Of critical
importance is the specific content of the manual under examination in terms
of more generally prescribed international norms. It is not enough to develop
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a mechanical checklist to verify that certain items are in the manual. How
they are translated into the pertinent vernacular and with what nuance and
shading are also important. Content must be examined not only in terms of
what is manifest in a particular manual, but in terms of the aggregate of orders
about action putatively regulated by the law of armed conflict. Consideration
should also be given to the relative ease with which a provision could be
perversely construed to allow for self-serving interpretations in the future.
In short, inquiry must identify the larger, functional manual and not only
the words enclosed by pasteboard covers on which the word "manual" is
emblazoned. Training publications and other instructional material regarding
tactics may, for example, implicate referenced norms. If, by way of
hypothesis, classified orders were to state that, on the occurrence of certain
contingencies, those orders come into operation and override normative
material that is found in any other communication, those orders would have
to be considered part of the manual.
(ii) Mode of Delivery or Vehicle: Normative information may be
conveyed in many forms. The advantage of a manual, especially in a
hierarchical setting, is that it is relatively precise and unchanging, allowing
for standardization and clarity in communication and ease in ascription of
responsibility. It is also relatively easy to disseminate. 19 Each operative may
be given a complete manual. The test is not satisfied, however, unless the
content of the manual is in fact disseminated to the appropriate levels in
credible fashion. 20 Timing here can be of moment since early indoctrination
might stimulate more resistance to a potential violation.
Equally relevant, a manual simplifies international surveillance. While one
should resist elevating form over substance, form here is of decided
importance. Written prescriptions have a permanence which makes
repudiation observable even to those not targeted by the dissemination. 21
There is a greater political cost involved in violations which are inconsistent
with previous governmental statements. On the other hand, there are military
organizations or situations in which manuals may be inappropriate. Where,
for example, officers and ranks are illiterate or semi-literate, other vehicles
for dissemination must be sought.22 Likewise, dissemination should take
account of the decision-making level of the target. Each sailor, for example,
need not possess a manual explaining the juridical bay concept.
(iii) Secondary Norms: Unless a manual is identified by secondary
norms within the organization as of transcending importance, it is not worth
the paper on which it is printed. The key norms in this regard are, first, the
preeminence of international law over national law and second, that superior
orders do not constitute a defense to a violation of international law. These
secondary norms must be effective. Here again, words do not suffice. The
expectations of the effectiveness of norms are sustained and reinforced by
the availability of manifest and credible methods of implementation; norms
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erode into lex simulata if it becomes apparent that there is neither means nor
will to implement them. During combat, the more proximate authority and
control system will prevail over the more distant. Hence, from a practical
standpoint, it is important that the substantive content of the international
norm be incorporated before conflict. This will constitute effective
superordination of international over nationallaw. 23
(iv) Systems of Enforcement: There must be an environing
indigenous system of enforcement of the norms which is sufficiently manifest
and efficient to become part of the expectation pattern of those whose
behavior is the target of the norms in question. This component is closely
tied to that of secondary norms in that it is the domestic enforcement system
which gives teeth to the acknowledged preeminence of internationallaw.24
(v) Reciprocity: The military organization must provide for an
accurate method for determining whether adversarial behavior is reciprocal
where reciprocity is an element of continuing validity.25 It is important that
there be distinctions between the inevitable single unauthorized violations
of prescribed norms, on the one hand, which should not authorize suspension
of the norms by the other party, and systematic authorized violations, which
should warrant suspension.26 Without the means for making such distinctions,
certain norms are likely to be suspended shortly after the first shot is fired.27
On the basis of the foregoing factors, comparative appraisals of the
effectiveness of military manuals may be expressed in terms of a general
quotient. More importantly, these distinct inquiries may be useful in terms
of identifying pathologies with particularity and targeting them for
appropriate remedies.

II. Military Manuals As Part Of The Process
Of Making International Law
In addition to their important function in dissemination and transmission
of international legal information, manuals are an important mode for making
international law as well as evidencing its existence.
Lawmaking, in any setting, involves the determination and communication
of normative information accompanied by authorizing symbols and credible
indications of control intention. In organized national systems, the popular
and scholarly conception of this activity has involved prescription through
legislatures and other highly institutionalized prescribing modes.
Consensual international law is essentially made in two ways: by explicit
agreement and by implicit agreement-which is usually referred to as custom.
Explicit agreement includes treaties, the classic mode, as well as many newer
methods involving explicit clarification of policy in an organized arena.
Implicit agreement includes all the modes by which authoritative policy is
informally arrived at and intercommunicated.
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With regard to international law concerning the conduct of military
conflict, manuals are important in both modes. Even when norms are
prescribed in formal settings, a critical phase in their consolidation is national
incorporation. Because international law notoriously lacks its own
enforcement system, national implementation is often a critical factor in
successful international lawmaking. The content of manuals, while not
absolutely probative that particular international norms are being effected
at the national level, is a conditio sine qua non for their implementation.
Certainly, both the absence of a manual or the use of manuals whose content
does not include the relevant norms would strongly suggest that those norms
have not been adopted. 28
Manuals play an. even larger role in processes of implicit agreement. In
the international system, as is well known, the bulk of international
prescription is accomplished through processes which are informal and noninstitutionalized. The critical building block in these processes is national
action. It is not surprising that the u.s. Military Tribunal at Nuremburg stated
that while not in themselves a competent source of international law, "[army
regulations], as they bear upon a question of custom and practice in the
conduct of war, might have evidentiary value, particularly if the applicable
portions had been put into general practice. "29 Customary law is even more
significant to the law of naval warfare since, it has been argued, attempts
to codify norms relevant to land warfare have historically enjoyed more
success than similar attempts regarding naval warfare. 30
Some international norms are formed by homologous national action.
Consider The Scotia case31 in which Justice Strong ruled in favor of a British
ship which had collided with an American vessel. He found that British orders
regarding navigational lights had in fact become international law.
Homologous national action may be evidenced in manuals or their functional
equivalent.32 Given the competitive character of their enterprise, specialists
in adversary organizations will scrutinize the operational codes of their
opponents to determine whether particular international norms have been
adopted and put into effect. 33 The extent to which they have will obviously
influence the willingness of others to adopt and act on them.
The chivalric code of the Middle Ages was largely generated in this fashion.
Since a vast majority of warriors, like the population at large, were illiterate,
a written manual would have been pointless. Functional manuals transmitted
authorized norms of warfare through a familiar oral tradition. Froissart
recorded a fourteenth century incident which evidences the existence of this
functional manual. Upon surrender, three French knights gave themselves to
their English captors saying, "We are yours: you have vanquished us. Act
therefore to the law of arms."34
A number of norms in the contemporary law of armed conflict may be
traced to this pattern oflawmaking. Even in antiquity rules of warfare were

Reisman and Leitzau

9

often orally disseminated to troops. Cyrus, King of Persia (559 B.C.),
Alexander the Great (333 B.C.), and Titus of Rome (70 B.C.) all insisted that
their troops observe basic humanitarian rules such as sparing civilian
populations and property and respecting religious buildings.35 Protection of
enemy wounded and prisoners of war can also be traced to earlier oral codes.36
For the latent lawmaking function no less than for the immediate operation
of the laws of armed conflict, it is important that manuals be made available
to potential adversaries. 37 Ironically, however, notifying an adversary
regarding battlefield intentions may yield strategic or tactical advantages. It
will be recalled that many in the military felt and still feel that the publication
by Senator Goldwater of Rules of Engagement for part of the Vietnam theatre
undermined u.S. military efforts there. 38 There is, thus, an understandable
reluctance to publicize this material. On the other hand, its suppression
decreases the probability of the norms being adopted by the adversary. It
might be useful for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
to act as a clearinghouse for such material as a way of facilitating
implementation and reinforcement of this part of the law of armed conflict.39

III. Military Manuals In Future Constructs
Alexander Bickel described the heroes among common law judges as those
who "imagined the past and remembered the future."4O Generals are often
cautioned against fighting their last war. Likewise, those who playa role in
defining legal relationships must keep abreast of developing trends and
technological advances. The probable role of military manuals in future
conflicts is a question as perplexing as that of how the next battle will be
fought.
Many futures can be imagined; in each, the role and degree of effectiveness
of military manuals will vary. In many, however, it would seem that effective
dissemination, which is favorably measured by tbe criteria laid out earlier,
will have some mitigating effect on the harshness and cruelty of warfare.
Technological advances and the melange of future conflicts may be significant
factors affecting the impact of manuals on the law of warfare. Dissemination
needs must be constantly reconsidered in light of these concerns.
Burgeoning technologies can significantly increase or decrease the number
of actors necessary to perpetrate an act of violence. It is unlikely that the
role of the individual rifleman will ever become obsolescent, but an increase
in irregular warfare can vastly increase the numbers of willing and unwilling
combatants and, as it were, consumers of the law of armed combat. At the
same time, however, each technological advance can also significantly reduce
the number of individual entities who need be concerned with the full range
of the rules of warfare. As more sophisticat,ed and efficient radars, targeting
systems, sensing devices and weapon delivery systems are developed,
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battlefield decisions become more concentrated at higher echelons. This is
especially true at sea where improved combat information systems allow
centralized control of myriad weapon systems. Manuals that are to be
continuously relevant will need to focus on the type of decisions made at these
levels.
Concurrent with increased efficiency and destructiveness, modem weapon
systems tend toward increasing the physical distance and reducing the
psychological linkages between the initiator of violence and its recipient. As
victims become more remote, the effect of the principle of chivalry declines
as an influence on conduct,41 and humanitarian law receives less assistance
from other cultural restraints on human behavior. The task of constraining
warfare becomes more difficult. Prescribers must make themselves cognizant
of the effects of such latent pathologies in technology-assisted decisionmaking if effective humanitarian norms are to be crafted and maintained.
A related factor affecting future combat is likely to be the development
of advanced rapid communication systems. As observed in recent U.S.
engagements,42 modem communication systems drastically reduce battlefield
decision-making, proportionately diminishing the need for field manuals,
while pushing manual requirements "upstairs. "43
On the other hand, the centrality of command and control in modem
warfare will certainly make communications a preferred early target. Current
strategies must consider the likelihood that adversaries will make every
attempt to disrupt communications.44 The same prudence demanded tactically
must be observed when considering the effect of contingencies on observance
of international law. Additionally, commanders' handbooks and manuals can
serve to prepare leaders for contingencies which implicate international law.
While a decision regarding neutral shipping, for example, may indeed be made
at higher levels than that of the on-site commanding officer, prior training
and familiarity with the manual may trigger an awareness of potential
international law problems. Thus, even if the manual is not explicitly used
as a reference to resolve a problem or question, it precipitates an identification
of the issue which can be transmitted to higher echelons or used in split-second
decisions. 45
The most unpredictable construct regarding international norms is the
twentieth century phenomenon of "total war." Partly a product of
technological advances, recent wars have entailed an element of totality
involving both mass participation and mass destruction. The ravages of the
First World War led nations to renounce war entirely with the KelloggBriand Pact,46 but they also highlighted the negative effects oflosing. While
total war may not have total winners, it can have total losers. Thus, a curious
irony ensues. The current law of armed conflict has been framed by parties
who have rejected warfare in general. Yet, when and if they do ever go to
war, their interest in winning will be compelling, to say the least.
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The potential severity of defeat in modem conflicts aggravates the
compliance problem. Indeed the advent of total warfare has spelled for several
theorists the death of jus in bello.47 To some, the psychopathic character of
von Clausewitz's statement, "[tJo introduce the principle of modernization
into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity," is
elevated to normality in total war scenarios.48 When loss could mean national
extinction, it is reasonable to assume that elites will reconsider past
agreements or decisions which are strategically limiting. In an absolute
conflict, a specific norm will rarely be attributed as much importance as
winning. 49
While key components of jus in bello seem likely to be an early casualty
on the battlefield, effective multilateral dissemination could serve to preserve
some lasting import for rules of warfare. Elites might understandably choose
to reject customary rules during a given conflict, but their ability to do so
is severely reduced once the rules have been effectively promulgated as we
described earlier. By the time a conflict escalates to such a level that elites
might consider abandoning norms, manuals will have been used for planning
and training, and the norms they establish will have been internalized by the
military and civilian components of the community. 50 The costs of attempting
to change those norms will have been raised.
All putative future legal constraints must take .account of reciprocity. If
a given adversary does not demonstrate reciprocal compliance with rules of
warfare, pressure to abandon norms is likely to come from the combatants
themselves. Similarly, the perceived content of the law of armed conflict
could quickly change if one were losing a large-scale war with an adversary
which had not adopted reciprocal normative constraints. Hence the effect
of military manuals may depend not only on the nature of the conflict but
the identity and behavior of the adversary.
In these future constructs, the target of dissemination shifts "upward" to
a few relatively senior leaders. In such an environment, the utility of manuals
both in effectuating and in making law may be greatly diminished. Accepted
norms will not incorporate the stability of wide-spread dissemination, and
secondary constraints will only be effective as they operate on elites. The
effect of domestic systems of enforcement and inherent constraints will be
low and, in a total war setting, the motivation to violate norms may be high.
Assurance of reciprocity, then, must come not through promises of non-use
but through more measurable agreements, e.g. verifiable disarmament,51 or
imaginative new schemes such as programming norms into weapon targeting
systems.
The design of manuals for the total war construct is not the end of inquiry;
. Iogy, " arme d confl·lct, " mstea
.
d 0 f" war " or " warrare,
f::
" suggests
the terffilno
that a certain number of future conflicts are expected to be limited in scope
and conducted in the context of routine peaceful activities or as protracted,
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low intensity be11igerencies.~2 Extended troop-intensive counter-insurgencies
must also be considered as well as limited reprisals and antiterrorist activities.
The resurgence of circumscribed reprisal/self-defense initiatives seen in
recent years 53 provide limited opportunities for actual field reference to
manuals due to the above mentioned nature of command and control.
Similarly, specialized antiterrorist or rescue operations are likely to be
specifically and thoroughly planned so as to obviate the need for referencing
a manual of international norms. Therefore, it is all the more urgent to
incox:p..orate a manual of appropriate norms in the formative and training
processes. Manuals will only have value in these conflicts if the norms they
contain have been internalized before the fact.
Guerrilla warfare and other forms of combat which may be extended in
time but limited in scope, could prove to be most suited for effective use
of military manuals. 54 In guerilla warfare, decision-making, by necessity, must
be delegated; the proliferation of inevitable personal contacts gives rise to
the kinds of situations most appropriately addressed in manuals and other
disseminations. 55 Unfortunately, this type of combat situation is not
adequately addressed by current conventions and treaties. 56
In all of the constructs outlined above, the effectiveness of military manuals
depends on two conditions: (i) dissemination and internalization of the norms
prior to the fact, and (ii) reciprocity. The current focus should be on thoroughly
incorporating international norms into planning and training exercises so that
they will not be quickly jettisoned in combat. Moreover, we must "remember
the future" and consider new schemes for effectively ensuring reciprocal
observance in the evolving social organization of armed conflict.
Conclusion
Manuals are not an end in themselves. They are an instrument for achieving
an end: the prescription and application of a law of armed conflict which
tempers the harshness and cruelty of combat and confmes human and material
destruction to targets of military necessity and utility.
Conflict is a social organization which requires a great deal of subjective
and objective symmetry between the antagonists if the conflict is to be
conducted in normatively authorized ways. The lower the level of subjective
and objective symmetry, the more difficult it will be to establish and make
effective norms regarding how armed conflict is to be conducted. Hence one
will find in the socio-political situation the ultimate limits for lawmaking
in this regard.
The point is of moment in any consideration of the possibilities of the
contemporary law of war. It is ironic that perspectives of how civilized
peoples are supposed to fight are relatively homogenous within alliances and,
formal documents notwithstanding, heterogeneous as between manifest and
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latent antagonists. The differences loom increasingly large in confrontations
between the West and Fundamentalist Islamic groups, for the latter draw
upon a history that has authorized and justified terror as a legitimate weapon
for an expanded notion of self-defense. Information available about the
training academies for terrorists in Iran suggest a functional manual, diverging
widely from that common in western military organizations. 57 Part of the
contemporary war against terrorism is, in fact, a war of manuals, in which
coercion is being used to make adversaries fight "civilized." The outcome
of this war is far from certain. If it is lost, future manuals will look quite
different from the one reviewed in this volume. The implications for national
values and domestic political processes could be grave.
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the fact. In other fields reciprocity can be measured because adherence to a norm can be observed. In
the area of armed conflict, however, true, or at least, operational intentions-the intentions that" count"cannot be easily observed until after the conflict has begun. Effective dissemination, coupled with the
metacommunication of a military law enforcement system (discussed below), demonstrates intention and
practice. Both serve as earnest for future agreements.
7. Dissemination is required by numerous provisions of treaties addressing the law of armed conflict
for this very reason. See e.g. article 47 of the Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949 (6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31); article 48 of the Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949. (6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85); article 127 of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 (6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135); article 144 of the Geneva
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287); article 25 of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 14 May 1954 (249 U.N.T.S. 240; U.S. not a party); and article
19 of the Protocol (II) Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 19n (161.L.M. 1448; U.S. not a party).
Protocol (I) Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 19n (16 I.L.M. 1391; U.S. not a party) serves as a good example
of the emphasis placed on dissemination; article 6 (training of qualified personnel); article 82 {legal advisors
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in armed forces); article 84 (rules of application); and article 87 (duty of commanders). The principal
provision regarding ·dissemination, article 83, states:
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of armed con£Iict, to
disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in their respective countries
and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military instruction and
to encourage the study thereof by the civilian population, so that those instruments may become
known to the armed forces and to the civilian population.
2. Any military or civilian authorities who, in time of armed con£Iict, assume responsibilities in
respect of the application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall be fully acquainted with the
text thereof.
IJ., p. 1427.
8. Some scholars from vanquished countries have opined that norms argued at the Nuremburg and
Tokyo war crimes trials are representative of this detrimental kind of ex post facto prescription. See, e.g.,
Wilbourn E. Benton and George Grimm, eds., Nuremburg, Gennan Views of the War Trials (Dallas, TX:
Southern Methodist University Press, 1955); WilliamJ. Bosch,judgment on Nuremburg (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1970); Eugene Davidson, The Nuremburg Fallacy (New York: Macmillan,
1973); Chihiro Hosoya, et aI., eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (New York: Kodansha International, 1986);
Richard H. Minear, Victors'justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1971). Cj. Ann Tusa and John Tusa, The Nuremburg Trial (New York: Atheneum, 1984).
9. Even Nuremburg prosecutors had at their disposal evidence demonstrating that international norms
had indeed been disseminated to German officers. See, e.g., "Introduction of the Hague Convention on
Land Warfare in the German Army," Proceedings of the Investigating Committee of the Gennan Constitutional
Assembly and the Gennan Reichstag 1919-1928 (resolution adding the Hague Convention text to the German
Field Manual); "German Military Law and Law of War, "journal of Military Law (German), January 1944,
pp. 389-93 (synopsis of course on military law); and A. Waltzog, Kriegsgerichtsrat der Luftwaffe (1942) (German
Air Force manual).
10. Consider, for example, Senate reservations and understandings regarding various treaties or the
evolution of departmental understandings of "customary law". One example, brought to our attention
by Professor Levie, concerns chemical warfare. After siguing the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
the Department of the Navy decided that it was in its interest to view the normative content as
representative of custom. The Navy's action may indeed have helped the norm to become custom. See
Howard S. Levie, "Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons," infra chapter XI.
A related example involves the U.S. practice of "restrictively" interpreting the use of straight baselines.
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Publication 9, 1987, par. 1.3.2
[hereafter cited as HanJbook]. This shaping of the general norm is a result of the transmission process.
See article 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 29 April 1958 (15 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205).
See, generally, Harold D. Lasswell, et aI., PropaganJa and Promotional Activities (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1969). For material on the bureaucratic process see Peter M. Blau and Marshall W. Meyer,
Bureaucracy in Modem Society, 2nd ed., (New York: Random House, 1971); Michel Crozier, The Bureallcratic
Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Henry Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the WoriJ
(E. Kanes trans.) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973);Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy
and Political Development, 2nd ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967); Max Weber,
"Bureaucracy," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1958). Cj. Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society (New York: AlfredA. Knopf,
1962). For a specific case study see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston: Little Brown, 1971).
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (seminal case regarding custodial interrogation and the
exclusionary rule).
12. See, e.g., Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, Congress Against the Court (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska
Press, 1970) (detailed account of Congressional reaction to Miranda); Fred P. Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound
(New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 305-32 (account of reaction to Miranda); Yale Kamisar, "How to Use,
Abuse-and Fight Back with-Crime Statistics," 25 Okla. L. Rev. 239 (1972). See also Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433 (1974) (construing MiranJa not to mean that the procedures themselves are rights); State v.
Bliss, 238 A.2d. 848 (Del. 1968) (MiranJa not applicable to minor crimes and traffic offenses).
13. E.g., Congressional endorsement of executive law regarding the discipline of the armed forces, chains
of command, delegated agencies assigned the task of writing various publications.
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14. E.g., "Orders" as opposed to "guidelines," posters and their locations, letterheads and other trappings
of officialdom.
15. See Handbook supra note 10; Department of the Army, FM 27-10, the Law ofLand Warfare (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1956); Department of the Air Force, AFP 110-31, International Law-The
Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976). Lower level
dissemination involves a wide variety ofless comprehensive training and instructional publications.
16. Consider the complex situations afflicting many decisions in the Vietuam conflict. The common
use of hamlets to shield Viet Cong combatants and the effective use of snipers, for example, contributed
to tensions with respect to prescriptions against attacking undefended villages and norms regarding
proportionality of response. See Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press,
1978), pp. 230-32.
17. It is important to realize, however, that the very existence of the manual, if adequately internalized,
is of significance regardless of any adumbrations of reciprocal dissemination or compliance. Treatment
of prisoners of war, for example, is an area in which reciprocity can rarely be observed until after the
fact. AdditionalIy, the targets of dissemination will seldom be the same actors who make comparisons
of other operational codes. Thus even without reciprocity, manuals may serve, at least temporarily, to
restrain one force in a manner which will not be reciprocated by the adversary. In a way whose significance
may vary with context, effective dissemination of unreciprocated norms could clearly disadvantage the
complying party.
18. Even historicalIy related military organizations may construe international norms differently in their
manuals. The British equivalent to the U.S. Army's field manual on the law of war states that defectors
should not be treated as prisoners of war. (The British War Office, The Law of War on Land being Part
III of the Manual of Military Law (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958), par. 126). U.S. policy,
derived from the same treaty provisions, is the opposite (Howard S. Levie, International Law Studies v. 59:
Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict (Newport, RI: Naval War ColIege Press, 1979), p. 80). For
differences between the British manual and the U.S. counterpart, see R.R. Baxter, "The Cambridge
Conference on the Revision of the Law of War", Am. Journal ofInt'1 Law, v. 47, p. 702 (1953).
19. Dissemination via military manuals is an encouraged means. See, International Committee of the
Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
(Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 963 [hereinafter cited as Commentary].
20. The International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter ICRC] regularly attempts to define
"credible fashion" in its publications and training programs. See, e.g., ICRC, Dissemination of International
Humanitarian Law and of the Principles and Ideals of the Red Cross, XXIVth ICRC Conference (1981). The ICRC
publishes a monthly periodical on the dissemination ofinternational humanitarian law entitled Dissemination.
It also organizes courses for teaching humanitarian law throughout the world. See "Dissemination Among
the Armed Forces", Dissemination, April 1985, p. 2.
ICRC conferences which have stressed the necessity of dissemination include: Centenary Congress, 1963,
Resolution IV; XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, 1965, Resolution XXI; XXIst
International Conference of the Red Cross, 1969, Resolution IX; XXIInd International Conference of
the Red Cross, 1973, Resolution XII; XXIIIrd International Conference of the Red Cross, 19n, Resolution
VII; XXIVth International Conference of the Red Cross, 1981, Resolution X.
A notable exception to the groups successfulIy targeted by the ICRC dissemination program has been
the armed forces of Warsaw Pact countries. See Independent Commission on International Humanitarian
Issues, Modern Wars: The Humanitarian Challenge (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1986), p. 174.
21. For an example of the potential long-term effects of written manuals on surveillance, see Military
and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar, v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, pars. 113 and 122
(merits 27 June 1986) (Court finding that CIA supplied FDN with a 1983 manual of psychological guerrilla
warfare which advocated certain violations of international law).
Written statements can also focus critical attention on a nation iflegal norms espoused in writing are
later rejected. A state may lose the benefit of not signing a specific treaty or convention if it later
promulgates regulations which comport with the norms therein.
22. The ICRC regularly participates in programs to promote the dissemination of international
humanitarian law throughout the world, often in colIaboration with the Henry Dunant Institute or the
International Institute of Humanitarian Law. See supra note 20.
23. The point bears emphasis. Genuine humanitarian concerns might cause a soldier to disobey a national
legal requirement, but international law will probably be ineffective in doing the same. Indoctrination
and training of military personnel is such that few would ever consider elevating international law over
national law , especialIy during war. Superordination must therefore take place within the national system;
national law, with its more immediate and effective sanctioning, must be made to reflect accepted
international norms.
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24. Military discipline can be said to serve the dual function of ensuring that orders are carried out
expeditiously and in accordance with the law. See AFP 110-31, supra note 15, pp. 1-5, pars. 1-3. A graphic
example of this latter function with respect to the law of armed conflict is found in article 44 of the
"Lieber Code" of 1863:
All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property
not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking
a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited
under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity
of the offense.
A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a superior
ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.
Secretary of War, General Orders No. 100, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field", 24 April 1863, reprinted in Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber's Code and the Law of War
(Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1983), p. 54.
See also Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d. 184 (1975), ceTt. den. 425 U.S. 911. Lieutenant Calley's court martial
demonstrates one answer to the need for an enforcement scheme in the post-Nuremburg world of limited
conflicts. Several provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice parallel or may implicate international
humanitarian law. See, e.g., art. 90 (Assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer);
art. 92 (Failure to obey order or regulation); art. 93 (Cruelty and maltreatment); art. 97 (Unlawful
detention); art. 99 (Misbehavior before the enemy); art. 102 (Forcing a safeguard); art. 103 (Captured
or abandoned property); art. 104 (Aiding the enemy); art. 105 (Misconduct as prisoner); art. 106 (Spies);
art. 106a (Espionage); art. 116 (Riot or breach of peace); art. 118 (Murder); art. 119 (Manslaughter); art.
120 (Rape and carnal knowledge); art. 121 (Larceny and wrongful appropriation); art. 122 (Robbery);
art. 124 (Maiming); art. 125 (Sodomy); art. 126 (Arson); art. 127 (Extortion); art. 128 (Assault); art. 129
(Burglary); art. 130 (Housebreaking); art. 134 (General article). Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. sections 801-940 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986). If other states do not apply similar domestic enforcement
schemes, dissemination of content is likely to be ineffectual.
25. Policies must be determined well before conflict but may be substantially based on expectations
regarding a potential adversary's likely conduct during a future encounter. Since the midst of combat
is too late for identifying pathologies or specific norms which are destined for nullification, we can only
look to "actions" which incorporate or manifestly demonstrate intent to obey (e.g. disarmament and!
or dissemination). The centrality of expectations of reciprocity is dramatic in U.S. policy regarding
chemical weapons. See Handbook, supra note 10, par. 10.3.2.1. The failure to reject second use ofsuch weapons
illustrates the deleterious effect on the norm caused by expected deviations.
26. It is worth noting that the Soviet Union claims to comply with Geneva Convention obligations
to disseminate norms. See 1. Blishchenko and V. Grin, International Humanitarian Law and the Red Cross
(Moscow: Executive Committee of the Order of Lenin Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
of the USSR, 1983), p. 36. (the authors state, "[t]he members of the Soviet Armed Forces study the
provisions of international humanitarian law regularly and systematically..•. All members of the Armed
Forces are familiarized with the texts of the Geneva Conventions.... The officer corps thoroughly study
the provisions of international humanitarian law." Id., p. 39. For an extensive compilation of various state
claims regarding dissemination see ICRC, Dissemination of Knowledge and Teaching of International Humanitarian
Law and of the Principles and Ideals of the Red Cross, Answers from Governments and National Societies to the 1. C.R. C.
Questionnaire, XXIVth ICRC Conference, (1981) [hereinafter cited as Answers].
27. It is important to differentiate those norms which are based primarily on reciprocity and those which
are not. Where absolutist concepts animate a construction of the rules, they will justify adherence regardless
of reciprocity. Some norms will be upheld for good order and discipline or to prevent grossly uncivilized
behavior. See, Thomas Nagel, "War and Massacre" in Charles R. Beitz, et aI., eds., International Ethics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 53-74. Internalizing norms within the rank-andfile can thus have an effect even outside of reciprocal agreement.
28. Even if a norm has been adopted, lack of a written manual greatly reduces the costs involved in
later disavowing it. Expectations therefore cannot be drawn.
29. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremburg Military Tribunal (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1950), v. XI, p. 1237. The effect of this dictum is unfortunately blurred since its focus was the incompetence
of regulations in authoritatively defming international law . The statement defeats a defense claim that
U.S. Army Regulations encouraged obedience even to unlawful orders.
30. See Robert W. Tucker, Naval War College International Law Studies, 1955: The Law of War and Neutrality
at Sea (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 26.
31. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871).
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32. Cooperative intergovernmental efforts in the development of manuals may assist in the process of
international norm formulation. See Baxter supra note 18 (discussing collaborative efforts between the
United States and Great Britain in updating army field manuals).
33. There seems to be little evidence that systematic comparisons are being made in the United States.
The ICRC has been actively monitoring disseminations however. See Answers supra note 26; and
International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Annexe documentaire (1972) (containing extracts
from the Federal Republic of Germany Military Instruction Manual, the U.S. Field Manual, the French
Regulations on general discipline in the armies, the British Manual of Military Law, the Italian "Law
of War" and the Swiss Manual on Laws and Customs of War).
34. Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed., Oeuvres de Froissart (Brussels: 1869), tome VIII, p. 43, reprinted in M.H.
Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 1 (treatment
of early codes and the principles of chivalry).
35. Kuhn, "Responsibility for Military Conduct and Respect for International Law," Dissemination,
August 1987, p. 1. See also, William E.S. Flory, Prisoners of War (Washington: American Council on Public
Affairs, 1942), pp. 10-15 (discussing treatment of prisoners in ancient and medieval times).
36. See Flory supra note 35. See also Keen supra note 34.
37. Intergovernmental communication of manuals has been specifically encouraged by the ICRC See
Commentary, supra note 19; International Institute of Humanitarian Law supra note 33.
38. "Statement of Senator Goldwater," Congressional Record, 6June 1976, p. S17551.
39. The ICRC has historically been extremely active in promoting dissemination of the law of armed
conflict. Indeed, the ICRC proposed a third paragraph to article 83 of the 1977 Protocol (I) to the 1949
Geneva Conventions which read: "The High Contracting Parties shall report to the depositary of the
Conventions and to the International Committee of the Red Cross at intervals of four years on the measures
they have taken in accordance with their obligations under this article." Commentary, supra note 19, p.
961, n. 15. The proposal was defeated in plenary. IJ., p. 963. The ICRC has begun soliciting dissemination
reports despite the failure to obtain a provision mandating them. See Answers supra note 26.
40. Bickel was quoting Namier in an address originally delivered in the 1969 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lecture series at Harvard Law School, reprinted in Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea ofProgress
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 13.
41. Legal limits on belligerent conduct are often described as being delineated by three principles: 1}
military necessity (justifying the amount and kind of force necessary to achieve submission of the enemy
with minimal expenditure of human and material resources); 2} humanity (prohibiting all force not
necessary for military purposes); 3} chivalry (prohibiting resort to dishonorable means). See Adam Roberts
and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 5; Myres S.
McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1961), pp. 521-30; Denise Bindschedler-Robert, "A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed
Conflicts," in Conference on Contemporary Problems of the Law of Armed Conflicts, Report, (New York:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1971), pp. 14-16; Morris Greenspan, The Modem Law of
Land Warfare (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 313-16.
42. Consider, for example, recent attacks on Iranian oil platforms. Communication resources enabled
the entire action to be directed from the White House. Julie Johnson, "Before the Order for Retaliation,
a Major Effort to Woo Congress", New York Times, 19 April 1988, p. Al:4.
43. The same technological advances have also multiplied the number of situations a commander might
confront. The utility curve for any given instruction or manual must. consider the downside of such
voluminous treatment.
44. See Paul Bracken, The Command and Control ofNuclear Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1983), pp. 219-20.
45. See Joseph Metcalf, III, "Decision Making and the Grenada Rescue Operation," in James G. March
and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Ambiguity and Command (Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1986), pp.
277-97 (demonstrating the continued need for relevant decision-making at various levels of the chain of
command). See also Col. William G. Eckhardt, "Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable
Standard," 97 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1982) (examining the criminal responsibility of superiors for subordinate
misconduct and the need for effective legal standards of professional military conduct).
46. Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 27 August 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, U.S.T.S.
796,94 L.N.T.S. 57.
47. See Michael Howard, "Temperamenta Belli: Can War Be Controlled?" in Michael Howard, ed.,
Restraints on War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) (arguing that the historical success of rules
depended on the limited nature of relevant conflicts); Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985) (criticizing total war); Flory supra note 35, p. 9 (many rules become inapplicable
in total war).
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48. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War(M. Howard and P. Paret trans.} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976), p. 76. But cf. Michael Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
It may be appropriate to note that rational explanations have been suggested for the validity of many
of the laws of warfare. Absolutist concepts and natural law arguments would favor adhering to
international norms of warfare without regard to adversary compliance. See Nagel supra note 27. In some
cases utilitarian arguments justify complying with certain rules even from a unilateral perspective. See
R.B. Brandt, "Utilitarianism and the Rules of War," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Winter 1972, p. 145.
Cf. N.W. Royse, Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare (New York: Harold Vinal,
1928) (predicting that only ultimate utility will be able to constrain aerial bombardment). Attention here
is directed to the "problem rules" - rules which disallow a tactically prudent or strategically advantageous
course of action. In extreme situations it is these rules which are in danger of being violated, and it is
these rules which publication in manuals might help to safeguard.
49. Consider the vain attempts to control air power and submarine warfare prior to World War II,
e.g., the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare ~')epartment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of tlte United States, 1923 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), v. I, p. 73; AmericanJournal of
International Law (Supp.), v. 17, p. 245 (1923); itl., v. 32, p. 12 (1938); the Proces-Verbal of 6 November
1936 Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty of
1930 (3 Bevans 298, 173 L.N.T.S. 353).
50. The import of this ramification obviously depends on the specific situation. If violating a norm
requires little additional training or is not particularly offensive to subordinate parties, the manual
limitation will be minimal.
51. Consider, for example, a chemical weapon system capable of being deployed via long-range cruise
missiles. An agreement to prohibit the use of such weapons is meaningless, even if effectively disseminated,
as long as the weapons exist in operational form and military organizations are prepared to employ them.
An elite decision to ignore the agreement would only incur international political costs, as opposed to
the more immediate concerns of reprogramming an entire military community.
52. See, James D. Atkinson and Donovan P. Yeuell, "Must \Ve Have World War III?", U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, July 1956, p. 711; Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1963).
53. E.g., U.S. punitive raids against Libya, the Grenada invasion, the Israeli preemptive attack on an
Iraqi nuclear facility, Chinese attacks on Vietnam, recent U.s. attacks on Iranian oil platforms.
54. For a didactic illustration of the effect of the Geneva Conventions on a limited conflict, see ICRC,
Protection of Victims of Armed Conj/ict, Falkland-Malvinas Islands (1984) (discussion of humanitarian law as it
applies to the conflict). See also Sally V. Mallison and W. Thomas Mallison, Armed Conj/ict in Lebanon,
1982: Humanitarian Law in a Real World Setting (Washington: American Educational Trust, 1983) (discussion
of humanitarian law applied to the invasion of Lebanon).
55. See Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976) (guerrilla warfare generally);
Walzer, supra note 48, pp. 176-96 (humanitarian law applied to guerrilla warfare).
56. See Keith Suter, An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984)
(discussing lack of progress in drafting rules for guerrilla warfare); Lewy, supra note 16, pp. 223-70
(provisions of Geneva conventions found inapplicable in many situations due to problematic tactics used
in Vietnam conflict). It is in this type of combat that the U.S. refusal to accept Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions may have the most impact, since the Prctocol changes requirements for prisoner'
of-war status.
57. See Amir Taheri, The Holy Terror: Inside the World ofIslamic Terrorism (Bethesda, MD: Adler and Adler,
1987). For historical background see Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (New York: Basic
Books, 1968). For contemporary application see Arsanjani, "The Impact of Islamic Fundamentalism on
International Politics and Law", American Society of International Law: Proceedings, 1988, p. 82 (forthcoming).

